

## Place, cultural selves, narrative: A diagram for culture-making<sup>1</sup>

[Yer, kültürel benlikler, anlatı: Kültür oluşturma için bir çizenek]

[Lieu, identités culturelles, récit : Un diagramme pour l'élaboration de la culture]

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### Abstract

This paper aims at an investigation into the relation between place and the self by looking at culture and narrative. Thus, the relation is regarded as a diagram for culture-making by way of narration, which will be examined from three perspectives, namely, first-person experience of place, second-person relation of cultural selves, and third-person knowledge of place. Following analysis of the three narrative levels in an autobiographical writing by Tara Westover from which confluence between place and the self is revealed in terms of culture-making, the paper proposes that both place and selves are narrated by way of transvaluation, that is, revaluation through diagrammatic imagination.

**Keywords:** Tara Westover, diagrammatic imagination, place, self, autobiographical writing

### Özet

Bu makale, kültür ve anlatıya bakarak yer ve benlik arasındaki ilişkiyi incelemeyi amaçlamaktadır. Böylece bu ilişki, birinci kişi yer deneyimi, ikinci kişi kültürel benlik ilişkisi ve üçüncü kişi yer bilgisi olmak üzere üç açıdan incelenecek olan anlatı yoluyla kültür yapımının bir çizimi olarak ele alınmaktadır. Tara Westover'ın özyaşamöyküsel bir yazısındaki üç anlatı düzeyinin incelemesine bakarak, yer ve benlik arasındaki yoğunluğun kültür yapımı açısından ortaya çıkarıldığı bu makale, hem yerin hem de benliklerin *baştan değerlendirme*, yani çizenek yoluyla hayal gücü ile yeniden değerlendirme yoluyla anlatılmasını önermektedir.

**Anahtar Kelimeler:** Tara Westover, çizeneksel imgelem, yer, benlik, özyaşamöyküsel yazı

### Résumé

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Cet article vise à étudier la relation entre le lieu et le soi en examinant la culture et la narration. Ainsi, la relation est considérée comme un diagramme pour l'élaboration de la culture par le biais de la narration, qui sera examinée de trois points de vue, à savoir l'expérience du lieu à la première personne, la relation du moi culturel à la deuxième personne et la connaissance du lieu à la troisième personne. Suite à l'analyse des trois niveaux narratifs d'un écrit autobiographique de Tara Westover, à partir duquel la confluence entre le lieu et le soi est révélée en termes de création culturelle, l'article propose que le lieu et le soi soient racontés par le biais d'une transvaluation, c'est-à-dire d'une réévaluation par le biais de l'imagination diagrammatique.

**Mots-clés :** Tara Westover, imagination diagrammatique, lieu, soi, écriture autobiographique

## 1. Introduction: Pragmatic inquiry on place and the narrating self

A book entitled *Educated: A memoir* was published in 2018 and became *The New York Times* bestseller of that year, being recommended and praised by celebrities including former US President Obama and Bill Gates. Autobiographical writing by Tara Westover, this book tells the story of her unique family, education, and freedom. She started to recall her early childhood and to reminisce about a remote and secluded place, her hometown Buxspeak in Idaho, without public education until the age of 16 due to her father's belief in Mormon religious doctrine. The story continues with her recent past including graduating from university and the academic achievement of receiving her Ph.D. in history at Cambridge University.

What intrigued me from this story was “the form of a relation” between place and self in autobiographical writing. Especially, narrational modes in reminiscing about her place and family were the center of attention. She was the youngest of 7 children and grew up in Buxspeak, Idaho, which is depicted as located in a valley surrounded by mountains. I recognized that the way she narrates by reminding, reminiscing, recognizing as modes of remembering was relevant to diagrammatic representation in a pragmatic inquiry on place with the narrating selfhood as semiotic agency. To be specific, the self's reminiscence of mental diagram is derived from the act of imagining (diagrammatic imagination), resulting in creative power of the narrating self, rather than reproductive imagination.

My hypothesis is that the creative power of the innovative self comes from “theoric transformation” accompanied with a “new perspective” (Pietarinen & Bellucci, 2016, pp. 464-465), which is related to the self's narrational perspectives from diagrammatic imagination. Based on the hypothesis, three perspectives of narration mode which are related to Peirce's qualitative categories of “modal structuralism” (Peirce, 2010, p. XXXVIII) are combined with Peirce's phenomenological categories. That is, a first-person perspective narration of access to place and self in Firstness; a third-person perspective narration of knowledge about the relation of place and self in Secondness; a second-person perspective narration of relatedness between self and other in Thirdness.

Why is theoric transformation involved? For Peirce, a diagram in mathematics is a product of pure imagination, which is different from empirical imagination (Pietarinen & Bellucci, 2016, p. 475, 471). Thus, a diagram as the form of a relation is like a schema in Kant. The relations of perception and conception, or substance and being, subject and predicate, are forms of relations, conditioned in comparison of interpretation by the self as a semiotic agent. Transformation is a third dimension of interpreting agency with intention and desire (Pietarinen & Bellucci, 2016, pp. 471-472). The semiotic human agency as a Third mediates between the inner world (reason) and the outer world (nature), clustering ideas with an inward occult power toward the ideal object of a diagram, discovering unexpected ideas which were not in the premises (Peirce, 2010, p. 39-41, 44).

Diagram is also a sign of an ideal object as the form of a relation on paper for observation and experiment for a mathematician (Peirce, 2010, p. 81 ). Thus, a visual mode of diagram is iconic and also a type (general). In this respect, it is worth noting that diagram belongs to projective geometry as a study of space where three dimensions are projected onto two dimensions in system of representation. (Peirce, 2010, p. 5; Pietarinen & Bellucci, 2016, p. 475). This means that:

Projective geometry (also called graphics or geometrical optic) is in the effect an extension of the doctrine of linear perspective; it is a geometry of straight lines. Now we cannot in any meaningful way single out or define a straight line within topology. Instead, the straight line is the product of *an externally imposed restriction* (de Waal, 2013, p. 70, emphasis added).

Then how does a diagram function in Peirce's phenomenology? For Peirce, phenomenology is a positive

science, while mathematics is a hypothetical science whose business is not necessarily to aim at the truth (Peirce, 2010, pp. 1-9). Peircean phenomenology (phaneroscopy) is concerned with consciousness where a phaneron has appeared. In this sense, a phaneron in the form of a relation appears in consciousness of human existence in Secondness. Regarding experience and consciousness, Peirce's phenomenology is regarded as a theory of categories which is related to the natural history of concepts (Peirce, 1906, *MS 299*; cited from Peirce, 2009, pp. 343-351). Accordingly, a diagram appearing as a phaneron in the form of a relation in phenomenology involves experiencing it through an iconic mode, producing diagrammatic imagination which is related to the act of reminiscing, which has a communal-discursive aspect (Casey, 2000, p. 107, 112, 264). In this respect, the idea of a diagram as a phaneron in the form of a relation can lead to my hypothesis that the meaning of relation of place and self is discovered by the narrating selfhood in three perspectives of narration by the individual self.

Diagram is one of the hypoicons in a Second category; it has iconic and symbolic character. In other words, icon-diagram belongs to Firstness as a phenomenological category and at the same time it is sinsign which belongs to Secondness as a material/ontological category. Moreover, a diagram as sinsign can also be symbolic, since it embodies a type as an ideal object. This combination of two sets of categories helps one to understand a diagram in imagination which involves the act of imagining, represented in a linguistic mode of autobiographical writing. The act of imagining is distinguished from imagination in psychology. It is related to an ideal object with intention and desire and has the possibility of practical effect in reality as an outcome in a pragmatistic sense because the reminiscer's perceptual act on the icon-diagram is associated with remembering a past idea; that is, sinsign of a diagram in imagination is to become a symbol of a future idea, transformed into the effective pragmatic meaning of the concept of object by interpretation.

In sum, the concept of diagram as an ideal object in mathematics is a prerequisite for the pragmatic inquiry on place. The ideal object will appear as a phaneron in phenomenology; in turn, it is experienced by an individual self in a diagram in imagination in the form of the relation of place and self. An individual self, reminiscing about the past idea through story-telling, undertakes the structuring of past experience of place, reliving the past. This narrating activity is a semiotic process of place and self. Based on configuration of the present and the past idea of place and self with different perspectives of narration by the individual self, the form of relation of place and self transforms into that of interpersonal communication in the end.

In the following sections, firstly, the sense of place and the sense of self are discussed from a first-person perspective, focusing on the personal pronoun "I", which is indexical and self-referential. The sense of place and the sense of self are connected by body-memory. Secondly, the form of relation of place and self as a phaneron is observed and analyzed by means of diagram in imagination in autobiographical writing. By virtue of a third-person perspective, an individual self prescind the predicate emotionally attached to a place, transforming into a subjective substance for an object of thinking. Thirdly, diagrammatic imagination of place and self by a narrating self will transform the relation into that of self and other for co-identity. This is a triadic relation of place, self, other through a second-person perspective of relatedness. In that sense, a place is seen as expression of the embodied idea of person, that is, interpersonal, communal space.

## **2. The sense of place and the sense of self**

The topic of place is within interdisciplinary studies in the areas of art and humanities, social science, and natural science. Especially, disciplines including art, anthropology, and philosophy are among those which deal with the topic with a specific mode of human existence: expression, action, thought. The study of place in connection with humanities emerged from the humanistic geography of Yi-Fu Tuan (1976). Since then, there have been many researches done through different perspectives and methodologies within various disciplines, areas, and fields (Cresswell, 2015; Champion, 2019; Casey, 1984, 1997; Malpas, 2014; 2018). Among these I would like to draw attention to two approaches: the phenomenological and the existential perspectives. The former was developed based on Merleau-Ponty's phenomenology of perception (Casey, 1984; Bredlau, 2019); the latter is grounded on Heidegger's existential philosophy of Being-in-the world (Malpas, 2014; 2018). These are approaches within the philosophical investigation of place where the idea of place is incorporated with that of experience in both a perceptual and a conceptual way.

My approach to a pragmatic inquiry on place contains two perspectives of experience by way of remembering with two modes, i.e. body-memory and place-memory, in autobiographical writing, focusing on a diagram in imagination. Thus, it turns out that the pragmatic inquiry on place is conditioned with Peirce's phenomenology

which is independent from semiotics; nevertheless, phenomenology involves description of the features of phaneron for analysis and evaluation (Atkins, 2018, p. 109). In this sense, a mental diagram as a phaneron from diagrammatic imagination is represented in a linguistic mode of narrative for evaluation. In this way, phenomenology is connected with logic/semiotics which is a formal science.<sup>2</sup>

For this reason, I take the autobiographical writing of Westover as a model for diagrammatic representation of a relation of place and self as a phaneron in narrative discourse. The first-person pronoun “I” is a focal point to connect the outer world (nature) and the inner world (reason). That is, “I” as an indexical and self-referential narrating self in narrative discourse mediates between a place and the self in order to have the sense of self and the sense of place as well. Then “what is I?”, and “who is I?” As an index, “I” indicates an individual in actuality as an organism, that is, an individual self. At the same time the symbol “I” refers to myself, that is, the given private self for a possibility of developing.<sup>3</sup> According to Peirce, we don't have an intuitive self-consciousness; “self-consciousness may easily be the result of inference” (Peirce, 1992, *EP* 1, pp.17-21). In Peirce's theory of self, self-consciousness means the knowledge of the self as the personal self (Peirce, 1992, *EP* 1, pp. 17-18). In this respect, the self is a sign which grows and evolves by means of semiosis. The conception of the self as the personal self involves an experience of human existence in Secondness; the individual self “I” is the body of experience which is in a continuum from the outer to the inner world between place and the self through narrating activity of place-experience with physical efforts.

The sense of place in the outer world and the sense of the self in the inner world are both the object of knowledge in the process of semiosis. “I” as an agent for individual human subject connects two worlds of fact and fancy through sense experience, attaching the sense of self to place just like a child in the private world where he/she perceives the world through body (Peirce, 1992, *EP* 1, p. 19). For example, for an infant, a table is sounding, rather than he/she hears the sound of the table. In this respect, in one's private world a body is the only medium of the knowledge of the world where the self consists in error and ignorance.

As for the self's narrational mode of reminding, the place, Buckspeak, functions as a reminder of *herself* in her private world, which is not communal inasmuch as her body is the only medium for experiencing a place, and therefore, the sense of a place becomes her private world. “I” am reminded of myself in my private world. Consequently, this mode of “I”, of *my* private self, in Firstness has first-person access to place, perceiving the place as if seeing *myself*. For instance, Westover is reminded of herself in her early childhood in a secluded place with a landscape, separated from the world outside, resting on her father's private world of belief in Mormon doctrine through the physical efforts of experiencing his world in Buckspeak. Thus, the relation of place and self is expressed as “I am Buckspeak, which is my world”. The young Westover defines herself by way of her place of Buckspeak. That is, she identifies herself with her place; this belongs to a phenomenological category of Firstness: a monad of a predicate with one blank which is combined with an I-I (myself) mode. Frequently, myself is characterized as felt-feeling of the idea of place in the first-person narrational mode.

### 3. Place in diagrammatic imagination

Westover's story-telling is a reminiscence about her family and events in Buckspeak in comparison with persons and things on the Cambridge and Harvard University campuses that she experienced while receiving education. The self's narration rests on reminiscence about individual occurrences, persons, and things, together with their meaning. What I observed from the autobiographical writing is that narrating activity itself is the semiotic process of structuring her experience coherently and this turns out to be a journey discovering or identifying the self, that is, the personal self. Marco Stango (2015) argues that the self is a third, or a person is a symbol; however, how the self transforms into a person is not discussed in detail, but he focuses on the individual self, which is characterized by individuality (actuality). Thus, Stango paid more attention to “I”, the first-person pronoun which is indexical and self-referential.

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<sup>2</sup> A more clear explanation of the connection between the two sciences is that “for the sciences prior to semiotics are conducted in a metalanguage that involves a variety of semiotic presuppositions. However, those sciences neither study those signs nor those semiotic presuppositions. That is the job of semiotics” (Atkins, 2018, p. 116).

<sup>3</sup> Peirce said that “pure apperception is self-assertion of the Ego” (Peirce, 1992, *EP* 1, p. 18). In this case, self-consciousness is the recognition of the *my* private self (ibid.). When I say the sense of the self, this refers to *my* private self.

Peirce put pronoun prior to noun in the way that he intended to devise his categories following three persons of the verb and the corresponding pronouns, that is I, THOU, IT; however, the logical or categorical order is different from the traditional grammatical order of the person (Fisch, 1982, p. XXIX); thus, the first-person pronoun, “I” is a First category; the second-person pronoun “You” is a Third category; the third-person pronoun “IT” is a Second category. The change of order is explained in Peirce's statement in 1861 in the book entitled “I, IT, and THOU”: “THOU is an IT in which there is another I. I looks in, It looks out, Thou looks through, out and in again” (ibid.). Fisch makes the point clear, stating that “THOU presupposes IT, and IT presupposes I. That is the reason for the difference between the categorical and the grammatical order” (ibid.). Later came the category revision to Firstness, Secondness, and Thirdness as phenomenological categories.

The reason why I draw on the linguistic personal pronouns is to investigate the self's act of remembering which is represented in three perspectives of narrational mode in narrative discourse employing Peirce's phenomenological categories. Thus, autobiographical writing is a model of mental diagram for experiment to investigate the relation of place and self, which is studied through a developmental approach in semiosis. This combination of the linguistic narrational mode of perspectives and phenomenological categories can reveal the form of a relation by the narrational self as semiotic human agency. Thus, the form of relations in three narrational modes<sup>4</sup> appears as I-I, I-IT, I-YOU, which are discussed in the way we analyze a relation of relations to comply with Peirce's phenomenological categories.

While I consider a phaneron, the form of a relation of place and self with a narrational I-I mode<sup>5</sup> (“I” myself/my place) in Firstness, as consisting in a predicate with one blank (one subject), the self as a possibility develops to the form of a relation with an I-IT narrational mode (I-the self/the place) in Secondness consisting in a predicate with two blanks (two subjects). With an I-I mode in Firstness, a place is a reminder and “I” as *my* private self is reminded, whereas with an I-IT mode in Secondness, an individual self “I” is a reminiscer, remembering a place voluntarily with intention and desire, so the experience of place by an individual self is mixed with perception and willingness in a form of action and reaction.

Edward Casey posited that there were three modes of remembering: reminding, reminiscing, and recognizing.<sup>6</sup> The description of the second mode, of reminiscing, is relevant to my argument on place in diagrammatic imagination, connecting the act of remembering with the act of imagining, fusing subjectivity and objectivity. This enables us to understand the concept of intersubjectivity by way of an individual self as semiotic agency. Casey stated that reminiscence had particular characteristics: self reminiscer, reminiscencia, wistfulness, a communal-discursive aspect, and auto reminiscing. Each of these is worth mentioning; however, they will not be discussed in detail in the present paper. I would like to draw attention now just to the communal discursive aspect. It seems that reminiscence about individual occurrences is associated with the private world, which is not communal; however, Casey stated that the reminiscing was shared with people through co-reminiscing when there was a lack of strict commonality of past experience or a diffuse commonality of era and ambiance (Casey, 2000, p.114). In that case, co-reminiscing proves normative for reminiscing as a whole, drawing on two corollaries: one is that reminiscing is mainly addressed to others; the other is that it is realized in language (Casey, 2000, p. 116). In this respect, place in diagrammatic imagination is represented with a linguistic mode for co-reminiscing with others. In this case, the self as a reminiscer is a focal point for observation as well. Autobiographical writing is regarded as auto-reminiscing which talks the past to oneself; however, as Casey rightly pointed out, writing is a fully visible medium, as a matter of tracing, of what Derrida calls “espacement”, so it bursts the bound of strict privacy and pursues a communal *telos* (Casey, 2000, p.118). Thus, writing which is potentially communal is an ideal realization, and consequently auto-reminiscing in writing has an

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<sup>4</sup> The self's three narrational modes here are considered as qualitative categories in the sense of the degree of intensity of quality or idea; thus, intensity of an individual self's feeling as an idea continues to develop into thought in generality (Peirce, 1992, *EP* 1, p. 313).

<sup>5</sup> For example, in the linguistic diagrammatic representation of Westover, this can be expressed as “Buckspeak is my world” or “My world is Buckspeak”. This type of felt-thinking experience is forced as in pure experience in which the self functions as patient. So, her memory of the past is involuntarily recalled by place, which is connected with body.

<sup>6</sup> Reminding is characterized as external force to make the act of remembering occur involuntarily, while reminiscing focuses on an individualistic and concrete feature so as to produce remembering voluntarily. Recognizing is a rather different dimension of remembering in terms of the interpersonal aspect, other human beings as objects of perceptual recognition (Casey, 2000, p. 89).

intersubjective aspect.

Then how is this kind of autobiographical writing possible? I intend to draw on the concept of the self which is a sign (a Third) functioning as agency, making two events connected with purposefulness toward the ideal object as a mediator, resulting in creative power, being situated beyond mechanical causality. Then, however, the self should be embodied in an individual who is thus embedding the private self. *My private self is separated from the private world when entering into symbolic and linguistic discourse for sharing and paying joint attention to object.*<sup>7</sup> In this sense, autobiographical writing as diagrammatic representation is a material tool for joint attention to the ideal object, that is, the form of relation of place and self. As I mentioned above, the concept of the self as such is in the process of developing in its relation with place as object. Then the self as human subject is regarded as the existential self in relation with object, the place; this leads to co-evolving into a person and a global sense of place, the world.

The idea of reminiscence by Casey echoes Peirce's statement on reminiscence as origin of a symbol in a Second category along with image and metaphor. Peirce stated, "Every symbol is, in its origin, either an image of the idea signified or a reminiscence of some individual occurrence, person or thing connected with its meaning or is a metaphor" (Peirce, 1932, *CP* 2, p. 222). It appears that a reminiscence is a singular symbol which is materialized in sign. I observe here that mental diagram which is a product of productive/scientific imagination is represented in autobiographical writing. The human subject who experiences the place with perception in a form of icon involves the act of imagining the ideal object of diagram in mathematics (Pietarinen & Bellucci, 2016, p. 479). Then the act of imagining is subjective and also objective, which leads to scientific imagination, producing a mental diagram for thought-experiment. This mental diagram is represented for the communal-discursive aspect of communication in autobiographical writing. In this perspective, the act of imagining is related to the act of reminiscing, voluntarily and involuntarily, by means of the individual self who has the potential to grow. So, reminiscence about a place is imagined as the form of relation between the place and the self, which is represented in autobiographical writing. Thus, place in diagrammatic imagination is understood as a mode of thinking through remembering for the purpose of conception of a relation of place and self. Accordingly, the I-IT mode of a third-person narration in Secondness can be described as place-naming for intersubjectivity, determining/defining the form of relation of place and self, as in the expression, "I came from Buckspeak, Idaho", a dyad with two subjects.

#### **4. Second-person standpoint: Place as expression of cultural selves**

Now the act of reminiscing is understood as reliving or re-experiencing the past (Casey, 2000, pp. 107-110) with imagination where the act of imagining is a quest for a meaning of the form of relation of the place and the self. Semiotically speaking, the present idea in an iconic moment encounters the past idea by diagrammatic imagination through reminiscing about individual events, places, and persons based on the act of imagining the ideal object. This leads to the transformation of the form of relation of place and self to that of the world and person. In this section, I would like to draw attention to the function of the self as a sign which develops to a person by narrational activity through which the human subject's experience of object, a place, is structured within the three narrational perspective modes by the self. Thus, as Peirce stated, "the selfhood you like to attribute to yourself is...the vulgarest delusion of vanity" (Peirce, 1966, *CP* 7, p. 571), but the self has the possibility of developing to be a person who is characterized by consistency in the semiotic process of narration. So "I, myself" is understood as like other self, the objective I. From this point of view, we are able to think of co-identity under personal selves in community.

As I mentioned above, the narrating self is functional as semiotic agency, which is worth emphasizing in terms of creative power of the self. This power comes from the relatedness in the dialogical self. Diagram, as the form of relation of place and self (and as that of object and subject,) these being effective relations, requires the power of self-control which operates through the dialogical self. The private self of separate human existence consists in error and ignorance in Peirce's early theory of the self; however, in his later theory of the self, the deliberate human subject of the individual self is the source of creative power, connecting the private

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<sup>7</sup> For example, Westover's self as agent for reminiscence of her place is expressed in this way for co-reminiscing, separating Buckspeak, a place in Idaho, from her world of Buckspeak: "I come from Buckspeak, Idaho". She writes that she has never spoken the word Idaho as she had no occasion to use that name in speech. So she comes to name the place Buckspeak, rather than feeling through body.

self with the personal self (cf. Colapietro, 1989).

To illustrate this point, we observe the change from perception to conception of a place in Westover's narration. Buckspeak was her place and her private world from the perspective of first-person access to the place through being reminded of her early childhood by way of sense perception. Thus, in the I-I mode of narration the subject is identified with the object as in the expression, "I am Buckspeak".

As the story-telling unfolds, the narrational mode changes to become more active, reminiscing about the place with individual events and things, selectively and voluntarily, in comparison with other places and other persons so as to know her place objectively. I have called this mode of narration the third-person perspective, I-IT mode in Secondness, so that two subjects show the form of relation as in the expression, "I came from Buckspeak". The two subjects are "Westover" and "Buckspeak", and the self's reminiscence of Buckspeak with its meaning forms a mental diagram. At this point, the role of the human subject as semiotic agent for a Third is positioned as meta-icon for comparison between the two. This is a condition for interpreting the relation, or projecting the form of relation, or expressing the place with pragmatic meaning. The dyadic relation between subject and object in double consciousness involves the interpreting agent of the dialogical self; that is, the narrational self as the personal self changes to the narrational mode of relatedness in a second-person perspective, which I have called an I-YOU mode in a triadic relation in Thirdness. This mode of narration enables us to think of myself as other self, or as the place of other.

Three subjects expressed as in "I tell you about Buckspeak" are "I", that is Westover, "you", that is, reader or another I/Westover, and "Buckspeak" in Idaho". From the second-person perspective narration, I myself is conceived to be as if you, yourself in narrative imagination, recognizing the place for co-reminiscing, thus also recognizing the concepts of place and the self, that is, the self as a person and the place as the world. Accordingly, Westover discovers the true self as a person and the place with practical significant effect as enabling her to understand her parents, sister and brothers who belong to the place, Buckspeak, which is, then, the place of other as well. The final part of her narration mode in the second-person relatedness shows her conception of the place, restoring the significance of the place which was lost but then found for the purpose of reconciliation between herself and her family. Eventually, the place becomes expressed as a model for interpersonal co-identity in the second-person perspective in Thirdness in a triadic relation by way of an individual self as the narrating semiotic agent.

Finally, I shall give the last paragraph of Westover's text and her commentary on the text using an I-YOU mode of narration:

That night I called on her and she didn't answer. She left me. She stayed in the mirror. The decisions I made after that moment were not the ones she would have made. They were the choices of a changed person, *a new self*. You could call this selfhood many things. Transformation. Metamorphosis. Falsity. Betrayal. I call it an education (Westover, 2018, pp. 328-329, italics added).

Here is a paragraph from her commentary on the text:

We are all more complicated than the roles we are assigned in stories. Nothing has revealed that truth to me more than writing this memoir—trying to pin down the people I love on paper, to capture the whole meaning of them in a few words, which is of course impossible. This is the best I can do: to tell that other story next to the one I remember. Of a summer day, a fire, the scent of charred flesh, and a father helping his son down the mountain (Westover, 2018, p. 334).

## 5. Conclusion

In this paper I attempt to implement a pragmatic inquiry on place from Peirce's idea of phenomenological categories combined with material categories. By way of this methodology, the self as semiotic agency by way of storytelling agent reveals the form of relation between place and the self as iconic diagram through which the act of imagining cooperates with the act of reminiscing in narrational activity for meaning-making.

This pragmatic inquiry on place and self in the form of iconic diagram involves phenomenology, epistemology, narrative, and subjectivity in language. In other words, the form of relation between place and self as a phaneron for meaning-making is concerned with semiotic object for epistemology, narrative experience for narrational activity, and linguistic mode for experimentation and observation.

This inquiry reveals that the self is to be understood as selves in that they are persons in relation. Furthermore,

a place is also a person, providing it has an idea embedded in it as extended mind. More importantly, I find that through subjectivity in language the semiotic self has participatory roles of patient (passive subject) and agent (active subject). On top of that, the self's role as an observer being observed from a second-person standpoint will be refined in thinking through dialogic imagination based on "tuism", which Peirce defined for the Century Dictionary as "the doctrine that all thought is addressed to a second person, or to one's future self as to a second person" (Fisch, 1982, p. XXIX). Instead of applying subjectivity in linguistic mode of I-YOU-IT in communication, we can train ourselves through the persona (character) of the narrative world of HE-YOU-I [per Paolucci, 2021] for mindreading, which aims at social cognition. This training will become a habit of action, resulting in shared maps of meaning in a community of inquiry, based on the acts of imagining, reminiscing, and narrating. Finally, I note that distributed semiotic agency (cf. Enfield & Kockelman, 2017) is operative in the course of dialogic semiosis, particularly with human agency as 'gnomic agency' (Kockelman, 2017) with the capacity of being an observer who is being observed. Such distributed semiotic human agency will be a measure of the quality of community in the 21st century in the quest for meaning and truth in life, including valuation between meaning-truth and knowledge-truth.

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